(SeaPRwire) – By: Julian Holbrooke
Let me be blunt about what happened on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this week. Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not fly to New York to recite talking points. He sat down after meeting Donald Trump and told reporters, flatly, that the risk of Russian attacks on other European countries is “very high.” Not possible. Not conceivable. Very high. I have covered enough of these carefully choreographed UN weeks to know when a wartime leader is freelancing fear for effect, and this was not that. This was a man who has spent years watching Russian missiles land in his cities telling Europe’s comfortable capitals that the fire does not respect the map. The most chilling line was his explanation of Putin’s logic. “How to divide unanimity in Europe? To attack somebody else. To attack and say, look, I will go further if you will not stop this.” Read that twice. Zelenskyy is not predicting an invasion of Poland tomorrow. He is describing a strategy of calibrated intimidation, designed to make supporting Ukraine feel more expensive than abandoning it.
Now weigh his words against the official record, because the record is uglier than the diplomatic phrasing suggests. On paper, Europe’s leaders have spent September issuing grave statements. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned on September 14 that peace in Europe itself is under threat, citing Russia’s Arctic presence and hybrid attacks. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk went further on September 17, saying Russia was planning drone or missile attacks against NATO countries backing Ukraine, potentially disguised as accidents to blur the alliance’s response. Fine words. But here is what the paper trail actually shows. An attempted drone attack hit Leipzig/Halle Airport on August 4, and German authorities did not publicly attribute it to Russia until September 1. A drone entered Romanian airspace on September 8, drifted back toward Moldova, and crashed. A week later, Italian jets under NATO’s air defense mission shot down a drone that crossed into Lithuanian airspace from Belarus. These are not hypotheticals. They are probes. Each one measures reaction time, political will, and how loudly the victim is willing to complain.
The real intention underneath Moscow’s behavior is not hard to decode, and Zelenskyy decoded it in one sentence. Putin cannot win decisively in Ukraine. He needs to justify the war to a Russian public that has paid for it in blood and rubles. So the next best outcome is to make Europe blink first. Frighten Berlin with an airport incident. Rattle Warsaw. Test whether a drone over Lithuania triggers Article 5 talk or a shrug and an “investigation.” Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs admitted the quiet truth to The Guardian on September 18: Europe and NATO are struggling to keep pace with drone warfare, and the gaps in air and missile defenses are real. That admission matters more than any communique. It tells Moscow the probes are working. Meanwhile Zelenskyy used his Trump meeting to push two concrete asks, a mutual halt to strikes on energy infrastructure and more Patriot missiles before winter. He got warmth and words on air defense, but no firm commitment on immediate deliveries. Kyiv is ready for the energy truce, he said, while doubting Russia would reciprocate. That asymmetry tells you everything about who wants de-escalation and who wants leverage.
So where does the pendulum swing from here? Zelenskyy’s own answer was stripped of diplomatic varnish. “Respond. Always respond. It’s not about the war. If you don’t respond, Russians, they will go further.” He is right, and the history of the past decade proves the cost of the alternative. Every unprosecuted incursion becomes a precedent. Every “accidental” drone left uninvestigated becomes a template. Europe now faces a narrow choice: treat each airspace violation as the act of state pressure it is, with unified NATO consequences attached, or keep issuing September statements while the probes grow bolder and the attribution grows slower. My read, after years of watching this dance, is that deterrence in 2025 will not be rebuilt with summit communiques or carefully worded warnings. It will be rebuilt the first time a Russian drone crosses a NATO border and the response is immediate, collective, and unmistakably priced in advance. Until that day arrives, Zelenskyy’s warning stands as exactly what he intended it to be. Not a prediction. A countdown.
Author bio: Julian Holbrooke is an international relations analyst and longtime contributor to major European daily newspapers, specializing in transatlantic security, NATO strategy, and the politics of deterrence in Eastern Europe.