The continues to impact Europe. The influx of over 1.3 million migrants, particularly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, who sought asylum that year has significantly fueled grievance-based European populism and benefited its most adept proponents. This has resulted in a cultural and shift that has redefined the continent’s political landscape.
Despite this, the initial decade of the far right’s ascendancy can be characterized as a period of “yes, but.” In Germany, the Alternative for Germany party has expanded its regional and federal footprint, yet all other major parties still consider political collaboration with it to be unacceptable. In France, the populist has demonstrated her capacity to reach the second round of presidential elections, but has been. In Italy, in 2022 became the first anti-immigrant populist to, but her robust cooperation with Brussels and steady support for Ukraine have helped her challenge common far-right perceptions. In the U.K., Brexit advocate Nigel Farage might now be, but this is still a considerable distance from securing victory in the next general elections in 2029.
Centrist administrations have also formed this year following and , even with increasing support for the far right. Meanwhile, the Dutch government, led by the far-right Party for Freedom, , and the Austrian Freedom Party failed to establish a ruling coalition despite winning elections in September.
Presently, E.U. institutions remain robust. Pro-E.U. parties maintain political dominance in Brussels, and the likelihood of Euroskeptics causing gridlock remains minimal. In the European Parliament, the centrist alliance that supported for a second term as European Commission President will maintain cohesion despite rising tensions. Within the European Council, only four of 27 members (Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, and the Czech Republic) are governed by nationalist parties. However, Brussels has effectively managed to restrict the capacity of far-right governments to alter E.U. policies, and figures like Meloni and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala collaborate closely with von der Leyen.
Nevertheless, the upcoming years will present substantial opportunities for Europe’s anti-migrant, Euroskeptic far right. Concerns regarding economic stability and persistently high prices remain the primary sources of financial apprehension for voters. Even as immigration policies and the number of asylum seekers in Europe has declined, the prolonged presence of migrants amidst sluggish economies will continue to fuel voter discontent. The economic pressures exerted by Donald Trump’s trade war further exacerbate public frustration with their current governments. In essence, there is no reason to believe that far-right parties and politicians will diminish or fail to achieve future political gains at the expense of struggling centrist establishments.
In two years, far-right parties will have their best opportunity yet to capitalize on growing voter anger, with national elections scheduled in France, Italy, Spain, and Poland. In France, although Le Pen is currently prohibited from seeking the presidency in March, her National Rally party could potentially secure power in the heart of Europe. In Italy, Meloni will face pressure to adopt more Euroskeptic stances on prominent issues leading up to the elections. In Spain, the center-right Popular Party is likely to lead the next government but might be compelled to include the in a coalition for the first time. In Poland, steadily declining support for could pave the way for the return of right-wing nationalist parties to power. The far-right Karol Nawrocki has already and is set to assume office in August.
Collectively, these developments would tip the balance of power in favor of populists, fundamentally altering how the E.U. defines its principles and interests. The potential repercussions—ranging from the rule of law, security, and economic affairs, to internal borders, engagement with an expansionist Russia, or even the very future of the E.U. itself—remain severe.