India and China are in the process of normalizing relations following a period of considerable strain.
Recently, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in New Delhi, where he met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other high-ranking Indian officials, concurrent with the resumption of direct flights between the two countries for the first time in five years. This interaction with his Indian counterpart, S. Jaishankar, marked only the second such encounter since the fatal 2020 border confrontations claimed the lives of at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers. Wang’s reportedly “positive” discussions appear to have set the stage for Modi’s inaugural visit to China in seven years later this month, where he is scheduled to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping.
This diplomatic thaw is occurring amidst increasing volatility in India-U.S. relations. President Donald Trump has levied tariffs on goods from India—the highest within Asia. White House Trade Advisor Peter Navarro has asserted that India functions as a “global clearinghouse for Russian oil,” by refining sanctioned crude and exporting it at significant value, thereby directing essential funds to Moscow. Adopting rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War era, Navarro cautioned: “If India desires to be considered a strategic ally of the U.S., it must begin to behave accordingly.” While India has refuted this allegation, it’s worth noting that the U.S. under the preceding Biden Administration had encouraged Delhi to purchase Russian oil to assist in stabilizing the global energy market.
However, such contentions hold little sway with Trump, whose aspirations for a swift trade agreement with India have been countered by Delhi’s firm negotiating posture, which is likely the genuine motivation behind the tariffs from a leader known for historically employing tariffs as a tool for leverage.
Regardless, public sentiment in India towards Trump is deteriorating as he publicly denigrates the nation and its governance. This situation is additionally impeding Indian officials’ capacity to forge agreements with Washington on complex matters such as trade. Moreover, it could jeopardize the meticulously developed Indo-Pacific strategies of both countries, raising uncertainties about the trajectory of the Quad grouping, where India collaborates with Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to address China’s expanding regional influence.
Consequently, the recent discord between the U.S. and India presents an awaited opportunity for Beijing—creating new avenues for China to collaborate with India on specific matters, not only to restore their relationship but also to soften the intensity of what was once a rapidly growing India-U.S. alliance.
However, it would be erroneous to perceive this primarily as a reaction to Trump’s conduct. Though Trump’s actions might have expedited the Sino-Indian dialogue, this deliberate process of normalization has been underway since October, when India and China arrived at an understanding regarding patrolling protocols to alleviate tensions along their contested Himalayan frontier.
Since the 2020 confrontations, Delhi consistently asserted that Beijing had unilaterally altered the status quo by constructing tents and observation posts on its side of the border. China’s agreement to disengage last year served as an implicit acknowledgment that Beijing’s activities were indeed the root cause of the crisis. Consequently, Delhi proceeded to reinstate political relations with China.
Following that, multiple measures have been adopted to normalize relations. China has granted permission for Indian pilgrims to access significant religious sites within the Tibet Autonomous Region this year. In reciprocity, India has reinstated visa services for Chinese visitors and consented to recommence discussions concerning the reopening of border trade via specified passes. During Wang’s recent visit, both nations also resolved to establish new expert and working groups for boundary demarcation, as China pledged to India that it would address its needs for fertilizers, rare earths, and tunnel boring machines (TBMs)—imports that have been affected by the strained Sino-Indian relationship.
However, in India, there are few who harbor illusions regarding the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. The past has seen numerous unfulfilled attempts at reconciliation. Irrespective of the U.S. involvement, India will maintain a vigilant stance concerning China’s intentions, given that the underlying dynamics of their relationship persist as competitive, and Delhi is eager to establish a deterrent framework to prevent a recurrence of a situation akin to 2020.
Should Trump truly be a contributing element, his influence is negligible.