A noteworthy scene unfolded in Tianjin on Monday as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shared laughs and smiles with China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
This display raises questions for Washington. For over twenty years, India’s foreign policy had been leaning towards closer ties with the U.S. and the West, while gradually distancing itself from Russia. India had opened its economy to the U.S. and set aside its longstanding reservations about deeper defense cooperation, joining the Quad alliance in 2007 and participating in joint military exercises with America. However, a reportedly tense interaction in June and the imposition of tariffs, among the highest the U.S. levies on any nation, changed the dynamic.
Putin is scheduled to visit India later this year, and there’s considerable optimism in Delhi regarding relations with Russia and China. However, it would be inaccurate to interpret this as the formation of a new India-China-Russia geopolitical bloc. Instead, it should be seen as a message to the Trump Administration that bullying will be met with resistance.
Delhi’s three choices
When Trump initially took action against India, Delhi had three options: yield to the pressure, remain passive, or implement a combination of symbolic and substantive measures while waiting for the situation to resolve. The first option would have required Modi to visit Washington and appease Trump, similar to leaders in Europe and Japan, by dismantling the trade barriers that were the stated cause of the tariffs. Had Modi chosen this path, it would have had significant domestic political repercussions for his hyper-nationalist party, portraying India as lacking the resolve to stand its ground. There’s a feeling in India that it was unfairly targeted, considering that Europe also purchases Russian energy, and China even more so, without facing similar penalties.
The second option for Delhi was inaction. However, this approach would have also had negative domestic political consequences, with influential political and media figures, as well as the opposition, accusing the government of weakness, thereby casting India in a negative light, unbecoming of its aspiration to be a major player in a multipolar world. Furthermore, doing nothing would have contradicted India’s established policy of resisting coercion on the global stage. Ultimately, this option would have been a losing proposition, as it would have neither persuaded Trump to reverse his policies nor benefited Modi domestically.
Therefore, Modi and his advisors chose the third option: implementing a mix of symbolic and substantive actions while essentially adopting a wait-and-see approach to determine if the trade dispute would dissipate.
The pitfalls of a India-China-Russia pact
The atmosphere at the 2025 Tianjin Shanghai Cooperation Summit was filled with camaraderie and goodwill among three of the world’s four most powerful nations. However, the SCO is a China-centered organization that reflects the country’s growing geopolitical influence, particularly in South Asia. This reality is well understood in Delhi.
Delhi does not want to rely on the SCO as the foundation of its strategic aspirations. It’s a regional organization in which India will remain involved, but it will not be a primary focus of its foreign policy. Moreover, there are still unresolved issues between India and China, including a long-standing border dispute that recently resurfaced in 2020-2021. While the Tianjin summit hasn’t resulted in a Sino-Indian reconciliation, it sends a clear message that if the U.S. decides to seek India’s assistance in containing China’s rise in the future, Delhi may be hesitant.
A similar rationale underlies Delhi’s approach to Moscow. While India has reduced its reliance on Russia in recent years, it remains the largest importer of Russian arms, and U.S. pressure is unlikely to change this quickly. The Indian foreign policy establishment has become even more convinced of the importance of maintaining the “Russia card” in its broader relationship with the U.S., given Trump’s unpredictability.
Ultimately, New Delhi does not want to be part of a Sino-Russian alliance against the U.S. As for China, it remains India’s primary challenge, one that can only be addressed by either balancing China’s growing power or aligning with it. The former is currently beyond Delhi’s capabilities, and the latter is a course that India is unwilling to take.
In other words, India aims to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region and increase engagement with the West and Southeast Asia, perhaps including a post-Trump America. Therefore, this is a temporary setback. Indians will be wary, anti-American sentiment will likely rise among the country’s strategic thinkers, and stories of American betrayals will persist for years to come.
However, none of this will fundamentally alter India’s overall strategic direction. Delhi’s commitment to multialignment—maintaining positive relationships with all major actors in the international system—has only been reinforced by Trump’s aggressive tactics.