The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin, China, drew considerable global interest. A significant portion of the discussion focused on the attendance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marking his first visit to China in seven years. Images from Tianjin depicted Modi alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Two main interpretations emerged from this event. One suggested that Modi, feeling the impact of President Donald Trump’s heavy tariffs on Indian exports to the U.S., was shifting his alignment towards China, implying Trump had driven an American ally into the adversary’s sphere. The second posited that Modi’s presence in Tianjin indicated the formation of a fresh global coalition—spearheaded by China, with backing from Russia and India—opposed to the U.S.
My assessment is that both of these deductions are premature, neglecting the stark economic and geopolitical truth that India cannot financially or strategically afford to sever its relationship with the U.S.
It is undeniable that Trump’s conduct towards India has been deplorable. Reliable reports indicate that the U.S. president’s imposition of tariffs on Indian exports was largely motivated by resentment.
After falsely asserting credit for brokering a peace deal between India and Pakistan earlier this year, Trump expected Modi to publicly show appreciation—and to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. While Pakistan’s prime minister complied, Modi declined to cooperate, which greatly angered Trump.
The tariffs, coupled with Trump’s contemptuous comments about India’s “dead economy,” undermined Modi’s ability to maintain the long-held belief that he shared a unique friendship with the American leader. For months, New Delhi officials had been boasting that their prime minister was Trump’s key ally in Asia, and that the U.S. saw India as a vital defense against China.
Now, Trump has demonstrated his lack of regard for Modi—and for India.
It is plausible that Modi might not have attended the Tianjin summit had the tariff discussions concluded differently. Firstly, he has harbored suspicion, verging on animosity, towards Xi for an extended period, and had avoided visiting India’s large neighbor to express discontent with China’s policies regarding India. These policies encompass economic, military, and diplomatic aid to Pakistan, as well as assertive claims on Indian land, alongside territorial encroachments and border skirmishes.
Secondly, Modi would likely not have enjoyed interacting closely with many of the other participants, including Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan; New Delhi recently condemned Erdogan for aligning with Islamabad during the brief India-Pakistan conflict in February. The majority of nations at the summit were represented by various forms of autocratic leaders—such as Iran’s Masoud Pezeshkian and Belarus’s Aleksandr Lukashenko.
The Indian prime minister’s attendance lent a degree of democratic credibility to this gathering of ostracized figures. (Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto canceled at the last minute.) This boosted Xi’s ego—far more than a Nobel nomination would have satisfied Trump’s—and also advanced his geopolitical objectives. Putin would also have been content, as the Russian leader could assert that he facilitated a closer relationship between the Asian powers.
Essentially, Modi transitioned from being America’s primary ally to a lesser figure at China’s event. No amount of posing for photographs in Tianjin could conceal the perceived demotion this entailed.
However, this does not signify that India is shifting its alignment away from the U.S. towards the East. The undeniable truth is that it is economically and strategically unable to do so.
The critical factor is the economy. India’s annual exports to the U.S., nearing $90 billion, significantly surpass its combined exports to all Shanghai Cooperation Organization members. While Xi and Putin may offer general goodwill to Modi, they cannot compensate for the reduction in export earnings that will stem from Trump’s tariffs. China and Russia are interested in increasing their sales to India, not purchasing more from it.
Geopolitics is another crucial aspect. Despite discussions about the Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant forming an alliance, Beijing still perceives New Delhi as a competitor—more specifically, a presumptuous rival—that occasionally requires being put in its place. China will maintain its role as Pakistan’s main supporter and will persist in asserting claims over substantial portions of Indian territory. Furthermore, India is unlikely to abandon its military alliances with the U.S. and other Asian countries, which Beijing considers hostile but New Delhi deems vital for its survival.
Solely for these reasons, Modi recognizes that he cannot deviate significantly from Washington’s influence. He will need to discover a dignified method to reconcile with Trump: India’s economic stability and national security rely on it.
Currently, Indian diplomats and lobbyists in Washington are working intensely to orchestrate a reconciliation. They might have anticipated that Trump would observe the images of Modi smiling with Xi and become concerned about losing an American ally. Unlikely: Trump’s response to Modi’s Tianjin visit has been dismissive, indicating that India is proposing to eliminate all tariffs on American products.
Xi will not overlook any of these developments. As a perpetual geopolitical realist, the Chinese president will understand that Modi’s attendance at his banquet was, at best, a move of convenience, and does not signal the beginning of a strong alliance.
He must also recognize that without India, his ambitious alliance against the U.S. and the West is unfeasible. Nations such as Indonesia and Turkey will consistently endeavor to maintain good relations with both sides. Once Modi reconciles with Trump, Xi will remain with Putin and the other isolated nations.