Crime and violence were already increasing in Colombia before the 39-year-old presidential candidate Miguel Uribe was in June. Just 10 days later, two distinct criminal organizations detonated a car bomb outside the air force base in Cali and shot down an army helicopter using a drone, resulting in at least the deaths of civilians and military personnel.
This surge in violence evokes the concern that Colombia, following over two decades of security improvements, a nation once plagued by and kidnappings, could rapidly regress into disorder. Nevertheless, Colombia’s situation is not isolated. Across Latin America, from Mexico to Chile, there are widespread about the inability to tackle violent crime, which is undermining leftist administrations and empowering increasingly authoritarian right-wing regimes.
Consider the example of . Prior to the self-proclaimed “” securing the presidency in 2019, his nation suffered from one of the . Bukele implemented a state of emergency, constructed the notorious CECOT facility—where the Trump Administration has been dispatching undocumented immigrants—and aggressively targeted criminal gangs. Currently, El Salvador’s homicide rate is among the , and Bukele’s approval rating remains .
However, his methodology carries significant drawbacks. Firstly, over individuals are incarcerated—an astonishing 2% of the population—with many awaiting indictment, let alone trial. Secondly, the 44-year-old Bukele, now bolstered by a and a Supreme Court filled with supporters, has to permit the President’s perpetual re-election, presumably his own.
The left in Latin America requires an alternative framework, lest it persist in surrendering influence to the right.
Left-leaning politicians in the region possess a justifiable skepticism toward law enforcement and the military, stemming from their experiences with harsh tactics under dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and other nations during the late 20th century. Nonetheless, addressing escalating crime necessitates a robust security approach. Alternative strategies have, to date, proven ineffective. In Mexico, former leftist President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s “” aimed to tackle the underlying socioeconomic causes of crime. Yet, the homicide rate during his six-year tenure.
In Ecuador, former President Rafael Correa, also from the left, the U.S. anti-narcotics air force base in Manta in the late 2000s. Partially consequently, the formerly tranquil nation has transformed into the , and a has ensued. This includes the assassination of presidential candidate in 2023 and TV journalists being in early 2024, which triggered a by the interim, and subsequently elected, 37-year-old President . Noboa has .
In Chile, another leftist leader, , has faced extensive critique regarding his administration’s failure to confront the nation’s . Crime has emerged as a significant and conservative is topping opinion surveys with a familiar hardline stance on crime in advance of the November elections.
This returns us to Colombia and its incumbent President. The leftist ‘s initial pledges to broker “total peace” were, at best, simplistic and, at worst, perilous. His aim was to broaden the 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to encompass other militant factions, many of whom are now engaged in criminal activities. Unsurprisingly, the strategy proved unsuccessful.
Such setbacks have only made Bukele’s stringent measures appear more appealing to both citizens worried about insecurity and aspiring right-wing politicians. The danger lies in the Bukele model, with all its , becoming widely adopted as elections approach in Chile, Colombia, and other nations.
Furthermore, U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently shown his for leaders who adopt a tough stance on crime. The Trump Administration is expected to endorse right-wing contenders over the coming two years in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Honduras, concurrently providing support to current governments in El Salvador and Ecuador.
The U.S.’s impartiality in its conventional backdoor diplomacy and a more human rights-oriented rule of law for its citizens will be compromised. However, an alternative is first necessary. To date, we await one.