An extensive operation continues to be carried out to locate and neutralize Palestinian militants implicated in the October 7, 2023 assault, according to analysts who spoke with Digital, characterizing this approach as a longstanding policy focused on both discouraging future attacks and delivering justice.
Last month, the Israel Defense Forces announced the elimination of Hasan Mahmoud Hasan Hussein, who on October 7 spearheaded the brutal assault on a bomb shelter on Route 232 in Kibbutz Re’im, where 16 individuals were viciously killed. Four others were abducted to Gaza, including Israeli American Hersh Goldberg-Polin, who later died in captivity.
The IDF also confirmed the deaths of Yousef Mahmoud Muhammad Juma’a, who led the Hamas cell that attacked Kibbutz Alumim; Mahmoud Afana, who notoriously boasted to his parents about murdering 10 Jews during the terrorist incursion; and Mohammed Hassan Mohammed Awad, who held slain hostages Shiri Bibas and her two children, Kfir and Ariel, and was linked to their murders, as well as the deaths of American citizens Gad Haggai and Judy Weinstein.
Israeli Prime Minister has pledged to settle accounts with Hamas, having previously asserted, “We will neither rest nor remain silent. We will pursue you, we will find you, and we will settle accounts with you.”
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, stated that this strategy dates back decades.
“After the Munich Olympics massacre [of 11 Israelis] in 1972, a decision was made that everyone involved in planning and executing these horrific terror attacks would be located and killed for three distinct purposes: the primary aim is to preempt further attacks, the second is deterrence, and the third is retribution,” Yadlin told Digital.
He noted that similar principles guided the United States’ targeting of Usama bin Laden after and, more recently, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. “None of these terrorists should die of old age,” he remarked.
Yadlin explained that intelligence is gathered by the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security agency analogous to the FBI; Aman, Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate, which serves as the country’s largest intelligence agency; and the Mossad, when the target is situated internationally. Strikes are typically executed by the air force, which he said is highly precise in targeting threats.
On July 31, 2024, Israel assassinated a Hamas political bureau chief during his visit for the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, utilizing an explosive device covertly placed in the Tehran guesthouse where he was residing.
The IDF also eliminated Yahya Sinwar, the former Hamas terror chief in Gaza; Mohammed Deif, the head of Hamas’s armed wing; and more recently, Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s brother and successor.
The Shin Bet has established a dedicated center exclusively focused on locating Hamas terrorists who participated in the October 7 massacre, according to Brig. Gen. (ret.) Lior Akerman, a senior researcher at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Reichman University.
“They were identified based on intelligence, photographs, testimonies, investigations, and other methods. From that moment, the hunt commences until they are arrested or eliminated,” Akerman, a former Shin Bet agent, told Digital.
Akerman stated that the Shin Bet employed the same approach during the Second Intifada, the Palestinian militant conflict in the early 2000s. He mentioned that Aziz Salha — who gained global notoriety from a video showing him lynching two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah’s twin city of el-Bireh on October 12, 2000 — was killed in October 2024 during an IDF strike in the Gaza Strip.
IDF Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi stressed that gathering intelligence on terrorists is an intricate process that relies on multiple sources.
“The Shin Bet and military intelligence units utilize many different types of sources; some involve human intelligence (HUMINT), based on informants who share information. Others include cyber and digital capabilities to access computers or phones, the use of cameras and visual intelligence (VISINT), and the ability to monitor areas with drones,” Avivi told Digital.
“You would require two sources to verify the position of a terrorist and then also ensure that he is sufficiently isolated to prevent danger to civilians. Once you manage to find the best operational conditions, you then choose the method of attack,” he added.
Avivi mentioned that collecting information on Hamas terrorists and the organization’s structure has been a continuous effort for years, encompassing the mapping of platoons, companies, and battalions, as well as the identification of commanders. Prior to the October 7 attacks, Israeli security forces already possessed extensive intelligence on many of the involved terrorists, including data derived from satellite images and intercepted communications.
Brig. Gen. (Res.) Nitzan Nuriel, former director of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau at the Prime Minister’s Office (2007–2012), informed Digital that Israel had acquired large volumes of Hamas data, including gigabytes of clips, pictures, and documents, which aided analysts in compiling critical intelligence.
While the events of October 7 involved significantly more perpetrators than typical terror attacks in Israel—with approximately 6,000 breaching the border that day—Nuriel said the methods for tracking them remain consistent; however, the larger scale implies a more prolonged process.
“I believe one of the reasons Hamas will be willing to accept a deal is because it allows many of them to remain beyond Israel’s long reach,” he continued. “If they agree to the entire proposal, some of them will survive.”