“Think of Mojtaba Khamenei as his father, but more extreme.”
This is how Kasra Aarabi, director of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps research at the advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran, characterized Iran’s new supreme leader in statements to Digital, following reports that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s son has been tapped to lead the Islamic Republic.
“Mojtaba has effectively been functioning as a ‘deputy supreme leader’ within the Bayt-e Rahbari—the office of his father and the central hub of the regime’s power,” Aarabi noted.
“His father established the Bayt’s vast infrastructure as a clandestine power base to guarantee regime stability in the event of his own removal—and with Mojtaba’s selection, that is precisely the outcome we are seeing,” Aarabi added.
President Donald Trump also addressed Mojtaba Khamenei’s ascension. In a conversation with the New York Post, Trump expressed his disapproval of the younger Khamenei succeeding his father, though he refrained from detailing potential U.S. countermeasures. “I’m not going to tell you,” Trump replied when questioned about his strategy regarding the new leader. “I’m not going to tell you. I’m not happy with him.”
An Iranian insider familiar with the leadership transition informed Digital that earlier theories suggesting Mojtaba might pursue reformist policies now appear highly improbable given the circumstances of his rise.
“There were previously rumors that if Mojtaba took power, he might initiate reforms to liberalize domestic politics and adopt a more conciliatory stance toward foreign policy,” the source explained.
“However, that prospect now seems very unlikely.”
According to the source, Mojtaba was selected “amidst internal disputes, controversy, and pressure from the IRGC,” implying that he “owes his position to their backing and therefore cannot act in opposition to their interests.”
The 56-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei has spent decades cultivating influence within the power apparatus surrounding the Iranian supreme leader.
Born in Mashhad in 1969, he pursued religious studies in Tehran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution that elevated his father. Over time, however, observers note that his authority was built less on traditional clerical standing and more through his ties to Iran’s security apparatus.
In 2019, the U.S. sanctioned Mojtaba under Executive Order 13867. The Treasury Department stated he had been “acting on behalf of the supreme leader in an official capacity, despite never having been elected or appointed to a government post beyond his work in his father’s office.”
Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, noted that Mojtaba’s background signals a significant shift within the Islamic Republic.
“Even though he wears a turban, Mojtaba is a product of the regime’s national security deep state,” Ben Taleblu told Digital. “Expect him to leverage the IRGC to maintain his grip on power.”
Aarabi observed that Mojtaba has spent years quietly consolidating his influence.
“His history shows a tendency to micromanage every facet of governance to satisfy his ambition,” Aarabi said, noting that Mojtaba allegedly moved IRGC command centers to his own office during periods of unrest, manipulated election results, and placed loyalists in key state positions.
Since 2019, Aarabi added, Mojtaba has been executing his father’s strategy to “purify” the regime by installing ideological hardliners throughout the political structure.
“Mojtaba is a staunchly antisemitic, anti-American, and anti-Western ideologue,” Aarabi stated. “He has been personally involved in domestic crackdowns and international terror operations.”
Analysts suggest that Mojtaba’s leadership may further empower Iran’s security institutions.
“The rise of the younger Khamenei accelerates trends that have been evident in Iranian politics and national security for years,” Ben Taleblu said. “Moving from one Khamenei to the next, one can expect the situation in Iran to deteriorate further if the regime remains in power.”
“And, much like his father, corruption is a family trait,” he added.
Ben Taleblu warned that the regime might also escalate external tensions as a means of survival.
“The regime recognizes its own fragility, but believes it can leverage crises and demand concessions to stay in power,” he said.
For opposition factions within Iran, the transition represents a continuation of the status quo rather than a shift toward reform.
“He is Khamenei’s son; they share the same ideology, the same strategy, and they intend to maintain the same policies,” said Khalid Azizi, spokesperson for the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran.
“It is very difficult to predict what he will do, but I do not expect a change in policy.”
The Iranian source who spoke with Digital noted that while future engagement with the U.S. and the West remains theoretically possible, the likelihood is minimal.
“As I stated,” the source said, “that possibility is very slim.”
“In short,” Aarabi concluded, “Mojtaba is his father on steroids. He is certainly no MBS.”