(SeaPRwire) –
By: Gwendolyn Vance
The June 9 car bombing that killed Lt. Gen. Damir Davydov in Balashikha wasn’t an isolated strike. Davydov was a Defense Ministry official responsible for supplying missiles and artillery to Russian forces in Ukraine. The blast landed exactly 1,150 feet from where another general, Yaroslav Moskalik, died in an April 2025 car bombing. Months earlier, Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov was killed in Moscow when a bomb hidden in an electric scooter exploded outside his apartment building. This isn’t just battlefield casualties—they’re a window into the Kremlin’s deepest internal rifts, ones that have festered for decades under Putin’s rule.
Independent Russian outlet Mediazona confirms at least 15 Russian generals have been killed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. That tally breaks down to five lieutenant generals, seven major generals, and three retired officers. Some died on the battlefield in Ukraine, like Lt. Gen. Oleg Tsokov, Maj. Gen. Sergei Goryachev, and Maj. Gen. Vladimir Zavadsky. Others were killed inside Russian territory or occupied Crimea, including Lt. Gen. Alexander Otroshchenko and retired Maj. Gen. Kanamat Botashev. The first confirmed losses came in the invasion’s opening weeks, with two major generals killed in Ukraine within days of one another.
A European intelligence source told reporters there are open frictions between Russia’s military and the FSB. The military wants the domestic security service to guarantee physical protection for its top commanders, but the FSB refuses to take responsibility for the military. This rivalry dates back to the Soviet era, with security services long viewing the armed forces as a potential threat. Putin himself comes from the FSB, cementing the agency’s privileged position over the military, and the source added that the killings are also eroding already low army morale.
The apparent compromise to this standoff shifted protection duties away from the FSB. Now, the security service of the Russian presidential administration handles close protection for top generals. Russian opposition figure Maxim Katz notes that Russian military leaders have long been locked out of senior government roles. For them, the FSB is a far greater threat than the Ukrainian army, as the agency has a history of targeting popular military leaders who could challenge the Kremlin’s power.
Katz also warns that these internal tensions will collide with Russia’s September parliamentary elections, a moment Western observers have largely ignored. The vote will not be free or fair, with the Kremlin expected to manipulate results to hand United Russia a decisive win. But if public support for the ruling party has dropped sharply, the regime will struggle to make the official results look believable. Putin’s legitimacy rests entirely on the perception that he holds majority public support.
The only way this regime’s internal rifts resolve is if either the security services turn on each other openly, or Putin loses the one tool that keeps his authoritarian hold intact: the illusion of broad popular support.
Author bio: Gwendolyn Vance, a deep-cover federal administration watch reporter and independent newsletter publisher.