Despite the continuous flow of aid into Gaza following President Biden’s ceasefire deal, an expert is challenging the accuracy of claims made by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) that famine conditions emerged in Gaza this summer — and is also questioning the agency’s organizational affiliations.

“Famine is distinguished from mere hunger or deprivation by its lethal nature,” David Adesnik, vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, explained to Digital. “By the IPC’s own definition — that famine accounts for two deaths per day per 10,000 people — the famine in the Gaza directorate should have by now led to approximately 9,000 deaths from hunger or hunger-related illnesses,” he elaborated. “They lacked data to show that this mortality rate had been met.”

On August 22, the IPC asserted that famine was present in Gaza governorate and was projected to expand to two additional governorates by September 30.

As of August 22, the Hamas-administered Gaza Ministry of Health reported that 273 Palestinians had died from famine and malnutrition over nearly two years of conflict. By October 7, this figure, it claimed, had risen to 460, representing an increase of 187 deaths.

“While I imagine it was a horrific end for those 187 individuals, a famine accusation must be substantiated by evidence,” Adesnik commented.

He highlighted that “the IPC forecast a major scarcity,” which he stated “should significantly increase prices. However, we have observed the opposite.”

The World Food Programme’s Palestine Market Monitor indicates that prices for 60 of 89 essential food and non-food items in three Gazan governorates either remained stable or decreased between the final week of August and the third week of September.

Digital inquired with the IPC, WFP, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) whether they believed, given the data on food pricing and mortality rates, that famine existed in Gaza. OCHA and FAO redirected their responses to the IPC, which did not reply.

Sources are also raising questions about potential bias in the IPC’s famine predictions. The IPC does not disclose the non-governmental organizations, government institutions, and U.N. agencies that form part of its overarching governance structure. These organizations also supply personnel who, as Technical Working Group (TWG) members, “support the funding, implementation and institutionalization of IPC at the country level.”

The IPC did not respond to queries regarding which NGO and U.N. entities are involved in its organization or how their salaries are covered.

Recently, U.N. agencies and international NGOs have faced accusations of alignment with Hamas.

Eri Kaneko stated that OCHA does not participate in IPC TWGs. The FAO, however, informed Digital that during crises, “the IPC coordinates global analyses with technical experts from several partner organizations, including FAO, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, and others from the wider IPC network, such as international and national NGOs.”

The U.N.’s food distribution model has been criticized due to severe looting by both armed and unarmed individuals. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) data shows that 80.5% (6,800 out of 8,440) of U.N. trucks have been intercepted since May 19.

“That can’t possibly be the most equitable way to distribute aid,” Adesnik remarked. “There’s some indication that in such situations, the strongest individuals manage to claim their share of the aid. This is contrary to what we would prefer, and the U.N. does not appear to be taking action to rectify the situation.”

Kaneko described aid interception as “a serious concern.” According to Kaneko, the U.N.’s plan for scaling operations “focuses on resuming community-based and household-level distributions – the most effective way to ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable.”

She explained that, in addition to the ceasefire, “for our plan to succeed, we also need open crossings; safe movement for civilians, including aid workers; unrestricted entry of goods; visas for humanitarian staff; space to operate; and a revival of the private sector.”

Since the ceasefire began, OCHA reported “a possible reduction in the rate of interception.” As of October 17, UNOPS data indicates that slightly more than 75% of items shipped into Gaza have reached their destinations since May.

Adesnik also raised concerns regarding modifications in OCHA Humanitarian Situation Reports, which previously detailed the proportion of aid seekers it claims died near (GHF) distribution sites versus those who died near U.N. aid convoys.

Not long after reports between July 21 and August 18 showed that more aid seekers perished at U.N. convoy sites (576) than near GHF distribution sites (259), Adesnik observed, “we noticed that for the first time, [OCHA] omitted that number of people killed while seeking aid.” Adesnik questioned whether “because the numbers turned against them, they’re just going to stop reporting it.”

Kaneko clarified that the change is temporary, explaining that data on deaths around convoys and distributions is “typically provided by two sources and always attributed accordingly” and that “if no new data is received from either source by the time an update is finalized, figures from that source may only appear in a subsequent update.”

Beginning aid deliveries in May, the U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation has provided over 185 million free meals to Palestinians, prompting questions about its potential to replace or supplement the U.N./NGO system. A GHF spokesperson informed Digital that GHF “has conveyed its openness and flexibility to adapt to U.N.-established norms” and “has been offering, for several months, to help the U.N. and other humanitarian groups deliver their aid securely and safely into Gaza.”

Further complicating the discussion about hunger in Gaza was a statement from UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini, who recently asserted, while commending the ceasefire agreement, that his agency possesses “enough to provide food for the entire population for the coming three months.”

In response to this assertion, Adesnik noted that “For the past five months, the U.N. has sent in thousands of trucks, knowing eight or nine out of ten would be looted. If they had coordinated with Israel on security, that aid could’ve been delivered into the hands of those who needed it most.”