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The Trump Administration’s Ukraine peace initiative—which recently proposed a 30-day ceasefire with Ukraine and Russia—has triggered alarm in European capitals. They fear the U.S. might abandon its NATO allies, making it crucial for them to defend themselves against Russia.
While some European rearmament is beneficial, a hasty and panicked approach risks decisions that could weaken European security and become unsustainable due to high costs.
Firstly, European nations must determine spending levels and procurement strategies. The proposed sums are substantial, with leading governments advocating for military spending increases to reach a target amount. Some analysts have suggested even higher figures, and Trump has also mentioned significant increases. E.U. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has highlighted the immediate need for a considerable investment to bolster defense capabilities, with expectations of further allocations.
Europe faces two primary dangers. The first is gearing rapid rearmament towards deploying a large military force to Ukraine, aiming to secure a peace agreement and, if necessary, combat Russia. This scenario is unlikely and inadvisable, despite apparent interest in London, Paris, and Kyiv. Russia has consistently rejected Western troops in Ukraine, and the Trump Administration has declined to support such a force. Consequently, this force would need to confront Russia—a nuclear power—without U.S. assistance. A majority in almost every European country are hesitant, and deploying such a force would require almost all of the U.K., France, and Germany’s deployable forces, leaving Poland and the Baltic States vulnerable.
The European rearmament drive is partly fueled by concerns that Russia might test NATO by engaging in aggressive actions. However, as David Ignatius noted in the Washington Post, European leaders express such deep anxiety about a potential attack that they are considering sending troops to Ukraine. This action could offer Russia an opportunity to “test” them with reduced risk and greater potential gains.
The second major error would be to follow the U.S. model of recent decades by investing heavily in limited numbers of advanced weapons platforms such as fighter jets, tanks and warships. Instead, cheaper weapons like drones; anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles; howitzers and ammunition; and landmines have proven vital in the Ukraine conflict.
The source of these weapons is another concern. The Trump Administration, like previous administrations, has urged Europe to purchase American arms. However, France and several other European governments maintain that rearmament should prioritize European-made weapons, seeking public support by framing it as a program for industrial development. Even in the best-case scenario, this will take time. Disagreements are already surfacing. Poland, along with the Baltic states, urgently wants to strengthen its forces with readily available weapons, rather than waiting for European options.
The weakness of Europe’s military industry stems largely from the challenges of coordinating and integrating production across different nations. For genuine integration, each nation would need to relinquish parts of its existing industries, with some potentially giving up nearly everything.
These discussions will be incredibly difficult. Fortunately, there is time, as a Russian attack on another NATO member remains unlikely in the near future, considering its experiences in Ukraine and a rational analysis of Russian motivations.
This allows for a deliberate and thoughtful strategy tailored to Europe’s true defense and industrial needs. There is a growing consensus that modern military technology favors defense. The Ukrainians stalled virtually the entire Russian army that invaded in February 2022, and have fought subsequent Russian attacks to a standstill, not with tanks and fighter jets, but huge numbers of cheap drones, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, 155 mm howitzers, and landmines (with of course critical help from U.S. intelligence).
Without massive new spending, Germany has already sharply increased its output of 155 mm shells, France can manufacture more man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, and European industry overall can produce large quantities of drones. This will allow Europe to deter future Russian aggression and to provide sufficient long-term military aid to Ukraine, ensuring that any renewed assault would be extremely costly and dangerous for Russia.
The final reason for European governments to exercise caution relates to the implications for European unity and other crucial areas of government activity. Italy and Spain, located far from Russia and facing migrant crises across the Mediterranean, do not perceive their core interests as threatened by Moscow. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has stated that “we will have to prioritize defense over other stuff,” but this “other stuff” includes essential investments in infrastructure and social welfare programs necessary for domestic stability.